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travel compelling-state-interest doctrine to land use ordinances is
inapposite, because such laws are highly complex, affect a multiplicity of interests, and are not practically susceptible to the rather mechanistic analysis employed in the Shapiro line of cases. Recognizing
that the old rationality standard does not adequately protect certain
public and private interests against the harmful effects of exclusionary laws, some courts have fashioned a stringent yet realistic standard which can prevent localities from "fencing out" natural growth
without depriving them of the ability to plan for that growth. If the
right to travel is regarded as among the liberties protected by the due
process clause, courts may in the future employ the currently developing standard of regional rationality to protect the legitimate interests of property owners and municipalities, as well as of potential
residents of those municipalities.
RAY V. HARTWELL, III

GOLDSTEIN v. CALIFORNIA AND THE
PROTECTION OF SOUND RECORDINGS: ARMING
THE STATES FOR BATTLE WITH THE PIRATES*
Introduction
The problem of the unauthorized duplication of records and tape
recordings, a practice commonly known as record piracy, has been an
increasingly troublesome one for the legitimate recording industry.'
The situation has become particularly acute in the past several de*A revised version of this article has been submitted in the 1974 Nathan Burkan
Memorial Competition, sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers, at the Washington and Lee University School of Law.
'Record piracy, a pejorative but nevertheless descriptive term, involves the direct
reproduction of existing records and/or pre-recorded tapes. Typically, the pirate purchases a popular, commercially available recording, re-records it perhaps hundredsof-thousands of times and sells the pirated copies, usually at a price below that of the
original. Thus the pirate is not only able to bypass all of the production and studio
costs borne by the original producer, but he is also in a position to choose to exploit
only those recordings which have demonstrated popularity and commercial success.
The pirate's close cousins are the "counterfeiter" and the "bootlegger." The counterfeiter goes beyond mere piracy of the recording itself and also duplicates the original
album sleeve or cartridge cover, includirig the original manufacturer's name and trademark. Such counterfeiting is expressly prohibited by federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 2318
(1970). See note 33 infra. The bootlegger, instead of duplicating a commercially available sound recording, makes his own by either surreptitiously recording a live performance by an artist or by obtaining the previously unreleased recordings by an artist. See
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cades, 2 due in large part to tremendous increases in the scope and
profitability of the entire entertainment industry and the explosive
growth in entertainment-related technology. Yet despite the dimensions of the record piracy business, the protection available to the
legitimate recording industry has been, at least until recently, something less than complete. This is due primarily to the fact that until
the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971,3 sound recordings4 were
not subject to statutory copyright protection under the Federal CopyKurlantzick, The Constitutionalityof State Law Protection of Sound Recordings, 5
CONN. L. REv. 204 (1972).
Of the three, the pirate, the focus of this article, is the most troublesome, primarily
because piracy is the most lucrative activity entailing the least amount of risk. The
plethora of literature which has appeared on the subject of record piracy attests to the
concern which the problem has generated. See, e.g., Helfer, Copyright Revision and
the Unauthorized Duplication of PhonographRecords-A New Statute and the Old
Problems: A Job Half Done, 14 BULL. CR. Soc. 137 (1966); Kurlantzick, Constitutionalityof StateLaw Protection of Sound Recordings, 5 CONN. L. REv. 204 (1972);
Schrader, Sound Recordings: Protection Under State Law and Under the Recent
Amendment to the Copyright Code, 14 ARIz. L. REv. 689 (1972); Yarnell, Recording
Piracy is Everybody's Burden: An Examination of Its Causes, Effects and Remedies,
20 BULL. CR. Soc. 234 (1973).
2
The annual volume of record piracy in the United States is estimated to be in
excess of $100 million. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971); Tape Indus.
Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340, 351 (C.D. Cal. 1970). Indeed, the
problem of record piracy has reached international proportions and there have been
efforts to deal with it on a worldwide level. See generally Kaminstein, Convention for
the Protectionof Producersof Phonograms against UnauthorizedDuplicationof Their
Phonograms, 19 BULL. CR. SOC. 175 (1972).
3
Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 1215 (1970) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(f), 5(n), 19, 20, 24, 26, 101(e) (Supp. 11, 1972)).
'It is important to distinguish the three component elements of a recording. First,
there is the underlying musical composition. This is the work of the composer and may
be copyrighted, subject to the compulsory license, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970). The compulsory license provision permits others to make a "similar use" of the composition
once the composer has initially authorized its use for recording purposes. The compulsory licensee need only file a Notice of Intention to Use and pay the two-cent statutory
royalty in order to record the composition himself without fear of an infringement
action brought by the composer. See generally I M. NIMMER, CoPYRIGHr §108.4 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as NIMMER]. See also text at notes 28-31 infra. But see notes 6 and
123 infra.
The second component element of a recording is the "sound recording." This is
the work product of the performer(s) and record producer(s) who join together to
produce a recording of the musical composition. It is this element of the recording
which is granted, for the first time, federal statutory copyright protection under the
Sound Recording Amendment. Prior to the enactment of the Amendment, the sound
recording element was not subject to copyright protection under the federal statute.
H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury
Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955); NIMMER § 35.12.
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right Act.' Thus, aggrieved record producers, manufacturers and performers were compelled to rely largely on state law as their primary
source of relief against record pirates.
The Sound Recording Amendment represents a Congressional response to the need for federal statutory copyright protection of sound
recordings. However, the Amendment provides for a federal copyright
only in those sound recordings .'fixed, published, and copyrighted" '
on or after its effective date.' Sound recordings "fixed" ' prior to that
date are still not copyrightable under the Federal Copyright Act. For
these pre-Amendment recordirigs, therefore, state law remains the
only potential source of protection.
In the recent case of Goldstein v. California,'"the Supreme Court
was faced with the question of whether the states could grant protection" to pre-Amendment sound recordings,' 2 or whether the grant of
protection to recordings is a matter of exclusive federal competence.
The final element is the tangible object-i.e., disc, tape, etc.-in which the sound
recording is embodied. No federal copyright protection attaches to this element, under
either the original Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970), or the Amendment, 17
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (Supp. II, 1972).
117 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
'Ringer, The Unauthorized Duplicationof Sound Recordings, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 117, 128-29 (1963) [hereinafter cited as STUDIES]. However, several cases have
granted federal statutory protection against piracy to the proprietor of the copyright
in the underlying musical composition on the theory that a pirate does not make a
"similar use" of the musical composition within the meaning of the compulsory license
provision, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970), and thus infringes upon the composer's copyright.
See Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847
(1972); Fame Publishing Co. v. S&S Distribs., Inc., 177 U.S.P.Q. 358 (N.D. Ala. 1973);
cf. Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912). See note 123 infra.
7
Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3 (Oct. 15, 1971).
'The effective date of the Amendment was February 15, 1972, four months after
the date of enactment. Id.
'"Fixation" occurs when "the complete series of sounds constituting the work is
first produced on a final master recording" which is later used to make additional
copies. 37 C.F.R. § 202.15(a) (1972).
10412 U.S. 546 (1973).
"The protection granted by California was in the form of a penal statute which
criminalized the dubbing activities of pirates. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (West 1970).
Thus, while the state was not granting a copyright per se, the protection afforded
owners of master discs or tapes by the statute was the functional equivalent of a
copyright enforceable against anyone subject to the state's jurisdiction. This is the
kind of state protection which Professor Goldstein has called "intrinsic" because it, in
effect, bears directly upon the copyright interest. See Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 CoLum. L. Ray. 49, 71-73 (1969).
2
All of the recordings which the defendants in Goldstein had been charged with
duplicating had been fixed prior to February 15, 1972, the effective date of the Sound
Recording Amendment. 412 U.S. at 552. See notes 8-9 supra.
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Briefly,' 3 Goldstein held that while the Constitution expressly grants
Congress the power to provide copyright protection,' 4 this grant of
power is not exclusive. Finding no constitutional impediment to the
concurrent exercise of copyright powers by the states,'" the Goldstein
Court then turned to a consideration of the Federal Copyright Act to
determine if Congress had preempted state protection. The Court
acknowledged that if such preemption were to be found in the Act,
state protection would be prohibited under the supremacy clause.
However, the Court found that neither the language of the Act nor
its history demonstrates that Congress intended to exercise fully its
constitutional grant of copyright powers.' 6 Thus the Court concluded
"that the State of California [by enacting an anti-piracy penal statute] has exercised a power which it retained under the Constitution,
and that the challenged statute, as applied in this case, does not
intrude into an area which Congress has, up to now, pre-empted." ' 7
The basic issue in Goldstein-the validity of state protection of
sound recordings-is one which has troubled the recording industry
since the enactment of the present Copyright Act in 1909.18 Although
it is now firmly established that sound recordings fall within the
scope of the copyright clause of the Constitution as "writings" of an
"author," and thus are constitutionally susceptible of federal copyright protection, 9 their status was not entirely clear at the time Congress was considering the 1909 Act.2 It was this uncertainty which,
3

See the extended discussion of the Goldstein decision at notes 67-84 and 138-60
and accompanying text infra.
"The copyright clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, grants to
Congress the power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries .... " As the Goldstein Court pointed out, this grant of
authority, while express, is not, in its own terms, exclusive. Additionally, the Court
found nothing in the Constitution which expressly bars the states from the exercise of
copyright power. 412 U.S. at 553.
"Id. at 552-61.
"Id. at 561-70.
11Id. at 571.
"See STUDiES at 139-56, discussing the various congressional proposals regarding
sound recordings from 1909 to 1957 and the involvement of representatives of the
recording industry in this legislative process.
"In Shaab v. Kleindienst, 345 F. Supp. 589 (D.D.C. 1972), the Sound Recording
Amendment was attacked on the grounds that sound recordings are not constitutionally copyrightable. The court upheld the Amendment. See also Capitol Records, Inc.
v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955) (dictum); H.R. REP. No. 487,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971) (accompanying Sound Recording Amendment); S. REP.
No. 72, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971); NIMMER §§ 8.2, 35.12.
2In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), the Supreme
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at least in part, prompted Congress to refuse to extend federal protection to sound recordings in the original 1909 Act.2'
In addition to misgivings about the constitutionality of copyright
protection for sound recordings, the congressional treatment afforded
them in 1909 was guided in large measure by fear of the possible
emergence of "a great music monopoly"22 which it was believed might
develop if composers were granted a copyright not only in their musical compositions but also in the recordings which embodied those
compositions. An important judicial backdrop to the congressional
approach to the monopoly question was the Supreme Court's decision
in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,2 decided in
1908.24 In Apollo, the Court ruled that piano rolls did not constitute
"copies" of the copyrighted musical composition embodied therein,
but were merely partof the machinery which served to reproduce that
composition.2 The primary significance of this holding was that an
Court, albeit in dictum, spoke of the copyright power as encompassing only "all forms
of ... visible expression." Id. at 58 (emphasis added). See also American Mutoscope
& Biograph Co. v. Edison Mfg. Co., 137 F. 262 (C.C.N.J. 1905); Kurlantzick, The
Constitutionalityof State Law Protectionof Sound Recordings, 5 CONN. L. REv. 204,
230 (1972).
21

During the course of the congressional hearings on the 1909 Act, Frank L. Dyer,
representing a number of record manufacturers, while submitting a draft bill which
would have granted a copyright in the recordings themselves, nevertheless expressed
grave doubts about the constitutionality of the provision. HearingsBefore Committees
on Patents on Pending Bills, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 302-09 (1908).
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1909).
nIndeed, Congress had specifically waited for the Court's decision in Apollo before
affirmatively acting upon the 1909 Act. H.R. REP. No. 7083, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
1, at 10; pt. 2, at 3-4.
2209 U.S. 1 (1908).

2nThe decision turned on the Court's reasoning that a "copy" of a musical composition must be in notation which is visually intelligible. Id. at 18. The analogy to disc
and tape recordings is readily apparent. If a piano roll, which does have visible markings although not in intelligible form, is to be denied the status of a "copy," disc or
tape recordings, which inherently have no visible markings, are clearly also not "copies."
However, Congress has, in part, legislatively overruled the Apollo decision by
providing in the Sound Recording Amendment that devices, such as discs or tapes,
which embody musical compositions "shall be considered copies of the copyrighted
musical works which they serve to reproduce mechanically ...

."

17 U.S.C. § 101(e)

(Supp. 1,1972). However, inasmuch as the Amendment leaves untouched the compulsory license provision, 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1970), the recognition of records and tapes as
"copies" of the musical composition merely extends to the composer the right to invoke
the same sanctions for failure to comply with the requirements of the compulsory
license as any other copyright owner enjoys. See Note, The Sound Recording Act of
1971: And End to Piracyon the High o's?, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 964, 983-84 (1972).
Thus the Amendment does not operate fully to overrule Apollo in the sense of making
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unauthorized duplication of piano rolls would not infringe the composer's copyright in the underlying musical composition. 6 Clearly,
the potential impact of the Apollo holding goes beyond simply piano
rolls to include by analogy other forms of mechanical reproduction
such as disc and tape recordings.
In 1909, a year after the Apollo decision, Congress enacted the
present Copyright Act. The congressional reaction to Apollo could
have been to redefine mechanical reproductions in the Act so that
they would constitute "copies" of the musical composition which
they serve to reproduce. This, however, would have given the proprietor of the copyright in the musical composition a copyright interest
in the mechanical reproduction itself. Congress feared that such a
result would open the door for large recording companies to buy up
the rights to these reproductions, thereby creating a "musical trust"
7
which would unduly hamper the dissemination of recorded music.
The solution which Congress ultimately adopted to protect composers while avoiding any danger of extensive monopolization in the
music industry was the compulsory license.2 Under the compulsory
licensing provision, 9 the composer is granted the exclusive right to
control only the first recording of his composition. When he initially
authorizes the use of his composition on a recording, his right is no
longer exclusive. Anyone may make "similar use" of the composition
the unauthorized duplication of records or tapes an infringement of the musical composition in all circumstnaces; compliance with the royalty and notice requirements of the
compulsory license provision will, even under the Amendment, still permit the duplicator to escape liability to the composer. But see note 123 infra.
"A somewhat less important by-product of the decision was that piano rolls or
other tangible objects which embodied the composition (e.g. records and tapes) in nonvisual form could not be filed as "copies" of the composition for copyright registration
purposes.
"See note 22 supra.
2I'he committee report which accompanied H.R. 28192, the 1909 Copyright Act,
sought to make it clear that composers were to receive no rights in the mechanical
reproduction beyond those provided by the compulsory license:
It is not the intention of the committee to extend the right of copyright
to the mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give the composer or copyright proprietor the control, in accordance with the
[compulsory license] provisions of the bill, of the manufacture and
use of such devices.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909). The Goldstein court interpreted this
passage not as an affirmative declaration of a congressional intent that mechanical
reproductions (i.e. sound recordings) were to receive no protection of any kind, but
rather the quoted language "was intended only to establish the limits of the composer's
right." 412 U.S. at 566 (original emphasis). Compare Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury
Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664-65 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., dissenting).
"17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970).
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merely by the filing of proper notice and the payment of the statutory
royalty fee.3 Aside from this limited interest, the original 1909 Act
vested in the composer no other rights in recordings of his compositions. 3' Nor did the Act grant to the record manufacturer or recording
artist any copyright interest in the recording. As a result, sound recordings were extended no federal protection. 3 Legitimate record
manufacturers and performers were therefore obligated to seek out
state law as virtually their only weapon against record pirates.3 3 The
Sound Recording Amendment of 1971 brings some measure of relief
3OSee note 4 supra.
31
See note 28 supra. But see note 6 supra and note 123 infra, citing the few cases
which have granted relief to the composer on the theory that direct duplication is not
a "similar use" within the meaning of the compulsory license provision. See also Note,
Record Piracy and Copyright: Present Inadequaciesand Future Overkill, 23 MAINE L.
REV. 359, 371-74 (1971), discussing the convergence and divergence of the economic
interests of manufacturers, performers and composers.
2A very early case, Fonotipia Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1909), contains
dictum to the effect that under the then newly-passed Copyright Act of 1909, "any
form of recording or transcribing a musical composition, or rendition of such composition [is] capable of registration, and the property rights therein secured under the
copyright statute ....
" Id. at 963. However, the notion that sound recordings were
specifically granted copyright protection under the Federal Copyright Act before the
1971 Amendment has since been authoritatively refuted. See NIMMER § 35.21. Indeed,
this viewpoint has prevailed throughout the history of the Copyright Act despite the
dictum in Fonotipia,with one commentator in 1940 deeming the point "settled." Note,
Rights of Recording OrchestrasAgainst Radio Stations Using Records for Broadcast
Purposes, 2 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 85, 86 (1940).
"Some -limited federal protection is embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (1970) which
provides criminal penalties, although no right of civil action, for the transportation or
sale in interstate commerce of records or tapes which bear a "forged or counterfeited
label." However, this statute goes only to the problem of counterfeiting, see note 1
supra,and thus may be easily circumvented by selling pirated recordings under a label
different from the original. This has been the practice of the pirates, and its success
in avoiding the sanctions of the statute is reflected in the absence of prosecutions
brought under the law. See NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1970, at 71 (no one prosecuted under
the statute in the eight years since its enactment). There are no reported cases under
the 18 U.S.C.A. § 2318 (Supp. 1973) annotations. Clearly, the federal statute has done
little to halt record piracy per se; it has merely prevented pirates from packaging and
selling their product as the original work. Despite the apparent failure of § 2318 to deal
effectively with the basic problem of record piracy, a bill has been recently introduced
which amends the statute to provide stiffer penalties. H.R. 13364, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 3 (1974). Under this amendment, penalties for violation of the statute would include
a fine up to $25,000 and imprisonment for up to three years for the first offense and a
fine of up to $50,000 and imprisonment for up to seven years for any subsequent
offense. Although these penalties may appear severe, they are in line with the penalties
prescribed in S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1769 (1973), an omnibus criminal revision
bill, now pending, which criminalizes the piracy (infringement) of copyrighted sound
recordings. See also note 34 infra.
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to this problem, but its limitation of copyright to those recordings
fixed on or after February 15, 1972, means that producers and perelsewhere for protection of preformers must continue to look
34
Amendment sound recordings.
One source of protection has been state anti-piracy penal statutes.
However, these statutes are of fairly recent originn and represent an
outgrowth of the protection earlier afforded by the states in civil
actions. The state protection granted in these civil suits has been
predicated upon such common law theories as right of privacy, interference with contractual or employment relations, injury to reputation and moral rights.3 However, the two most successful and widely
accepted theories have been the common law doctrines of common
law copyright and unfair competition,3 each representing a distinct
'Responding to this need for some form of federal protection, Senator Brock has
introduced a bill to make the interstate manufacture, transportation, sale or receipt
of a pirated recording without the consent of the owner of the master recording a misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to $1,000 and up to one year in jail. S. 3107, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The bill would prohibit unauthorized duplication regardless of
whether or not the recording was subject to a statutory copyright under the Sound
Recording Amendment. However, it would seem that the prescribed penalties are not
sufficiently severe, in light of the immense profit potential of record piracy, to effectively dissuade the activity.
In addition to Senator Brock's bill, there are also pending in Congress the Copyright Revision Bill, S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 501-06 (1973) and an omnibus
crime bill introduced by Senators Hruska and McClellan, S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 1769 (1973). The cited sections of both bills provide criminal penalties for piracy
(infringement) of copyrighted sound recordings. In addition, the Revision Bill provides
for civil action as well. Of these three pieces of legislation, Senator Brock's anti-piracy
bill appears to be in the best position for early passage. See BILLBOARD, March 16, 1974,
at 16. However, the Brock bill, by providing what is, in essence, federal copyright
protection unlimited in duration, is of questionable constitutionality. It appears that
the bill, as proposed, contravenes the "limited times" provision of the copyright clause.
See note 48 infra.
"3See Kurlantzick, The Constitutionalityof State Law Protection of Sound Recordings, 5 CONN. L. REv. 204, 207 & n.5 (1972).
-See STUDEs at 130, which lists opinions which have discussed these grounds. See
also Note, The Future of Record Piracy, 38 BROOK. L. REv. 406, 421-24 (1971). These
are the doctrines which Professor Goldstein labels "extrinsic" because their primary
thrust is to protect rights other than the copyright and their effect upon the copyright
interest is therefore a tangential one. See generally Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 49 (1969). Generally speaking, however, these theories have received little currency in the courts as a basis for granting
copyright-related state law relief. Thus they are not further discussed herein.
nThe Goldstein case highlights the third basis of effective state protection: penal
statutes protecting a specific class of works such as sound recordings. However, as an
historical and analytical matter, the primary emphasis has been upon the theories of
common law copyright and unfair competition. These are theories which Professor
Goldstein has called "intrinsic" as bearing directly upon the copyright interest. See
note 11 supra.
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8

3
and independent theory of state protection.
Regardless of the form of the state-granted protection, however,
the ultimate issue remains the constitutional validity of state protec0
tion of any kind. 39 The immediate import of Goldstein v. California"
is that it resolves this question of constitutional validity in favor of a
state grant of copyright protection in the form of a penal anti-piracy
statute. However, Goldstein's treatment of the state protection issue
holds significance beyond simply the validation of California's antipiracy statute. The decision represents approval of the concept of
state regulation of the copyright field, whatever form such regulation
may take, including both statutory and common law protection. Because of Goldstein's impact upon common law copyright and unfair
competition theories of state protection, and because of the important role that they have traditionally played in the recording industry's battle against record piracy, it is useful to analyze the Court's
reasoning in relation to these theories. Only by examining Goldstein
in light of the assumptions and premises which have grown up around
the concepts of common law copyright and unfair competition can
the decision be placed in its proper context and its significance fully
understood.

Common Law Copyright
Common law copyright, often referred to as "the right of first
"Because both common law copyright and unfair competition involves the recognition of property rights other than those provided for by the Federal Copyright Act,
and because it is possible for a single party to assert rights based upon both theories,
the courts have occasionally confused them and have used them interchangeably. See,
e.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), afl'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
This tendency, however, operates both to blur the important functional and conceptual
distinctions between the two doctrines and to obfuscate the basic issue of the validity
of the state protection. Therefore, in this note the two doctrines are discussed separately as distinct theories of state protection.
"The issue of the validity of state law protection has prompted comment from a
number of writers. See, e.g., Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright
Interest, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 49 (1969); Kalodner & Vance, The Relation Between
Federaland State Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1079
(1959); Kaplan, Performer'sRight and Copyright:The Capitol Records Case, 69 HAlv.
L. REV. 409 (1956); Kurlantzick, The Constitutionalityof State Law Protection of
Sound Recordings, 5 CONN. L. REV. 204 (1972); Nimmer, Copyright 1956: Recent
Trends in the Law of Artistic Property,4 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 323 (1957); Whicher, The
Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett: An Inquiry Into the ConstitutionalDistribution of
Powers Over the Law of Literary Property in the United States-Part1, 9 BULL. Ca.
Soc. 102 (1962).
"0412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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publication," is the doctrine which protects an author's proprietary
interest in his works before publication.' Common law copyright
protection is available for any work which represents "an original
intellectual creation," regardless of whether the work is eligible for a
statutory copyright. A common law copyright vests in its owner the
right to prohibit completely any unauthorized use of his unpublished
works.42 Section 2 of the Federal Copyright Act preserves the author's
common law rights in his unpublished work, and permits protection
of those rights by an action in law or equity.43 Section 2 thus operates
specifically to exclude unpublished works from the protective scope
of the Act. This express exclusion clearly indicates that state common
law copyright protection of sound recordings prior to their publication
has not been federally preempted, even if such recordings are susceptible after publication to statutory copyright protection under the
Sound Recording Amendment.44 However, the operative word-and
the one which introduces an element of uncertainty into common law
copyright protection-is the term "publication."
Nowhere in the Copyright Act is "publication" defined.45 This is
an unfortunate omission since the act of publication represents the
point at which common law copyright protection terminates and either the statutory copyright attaches or the work loses all protection,
thereafter passing into the public domain. Thus, regardless of
whether a particular work is subject to protection under the Copyright Act, it is afforded common law copyright protection up to the
moment of publication. If the work is within one of the categories-of
"writings" enumerated in the Act and if the statutory registration
and notice procedures are not complied with, it then passes into the
public domain upon publication and may thereafter be legitimately
copied by anyone.46 The concept of publication is therefore crucial in
"See Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296
N.Y.S.2d 771 (1969).
"STUDIES at 129.
a16 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). See the text of this section quoted at note 70 infra.
"In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964), the Supreme
Court expressly recognized the states' authority to grant common law copyright protection to unpublished works, while at the same time striking down the unfair competition
theory of state protection.
'1The Act does define "date of publication" as "the earliest date when copies of
the first authorized edition were placed on sale, sold, or publicly distributed .... "
17 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). However, it has-been held consistently that this section merely
specifies the time at which the statutory copyright, if any, begins running and that it
does not define publication itself. See NIMMER § 49.
"Publication is a prerequisite to the vesting of a statutory copyright, 17 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1970), although some works (not including sound recordings) may be granted
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determining the scope of the author's protection. If the definition of
publication47 applied by a state court permits the author to exploit
his work commercially without having that exploitation constitute
publication, the author is then in the enviable position of having
complete common law copyright protection of unlimited duration for
a work from which he is currently reaping financial award. 8
Perhaps nowhere is the tendency to grant perpetual protection by
applying a somewhat tortured definition of publication better illustrated than in the area of sound recordings. Because of judicial distaste for the activities of record pirates, a court may feel impelled to
apply a highly artificial and unduly restrictive definition of publication, particularly if the alternative is the irrevocable loss of all protection for the recording." However, in the process of granting such relief
the court also gives the record producer or performer a virtual carte
blanche to make extensive commercial use of his recordings without
subjecting such protection to a time limit. Many courts have reached
just such a result, holding that even the extensive public sale or
commercial distribution of recordings does not act as a publication
statutory copyright protection as unpublished works under § 12 of the Act. Thus there
are two sides to the coin of publication, one being the publication which dissipates the
author's common law copyright-"divestive publication"-and the other being the
publication which brings the work within the scope of the statute-"investive publication." Nimmer finds that in those cases involving the question of divestive publication,
the term "publication" is construed narrowly, while in those situations where the issue
involves an investive publication, the same term is construed broadly. The obvious
intent underlying this judicial tendency is to give the author the benefit of the doubt
and to minimize the possibility that he will be denied any protection at all. See
generally NIMMER § 58.2.
47

Nimmer has suggested a general definition of publication gleaned from the lan-

guage and holdings of a number of cases:
[Plublication occurs when by consent of the copyright owner, the
original or tangible copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned, given
away or otherwise made available to the general public, or when an
authorized offer is made to dispose of the work in any such manner
even if a sale or other disposition does not in fact occur.
NIMMER § 49 (emphasis deleted).
"In contrast, the copyright clause of the Constitution mandates that Congress may

grant copyright protection only for "limited times." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. As a result,
Congress has limited the duration of a statutory copyright to a maximum of fifty-six
years-twenty-eight under the original registration with a twenty-eight year renewal.
17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). Compare the proposed Copyright Revision Bill which provides
that the statutory copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and

fifty years after his death." S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(a) (1973).
"Mr. Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Goldstein, recognized this
tendency but warned that "we should not let our distaste for 'pirates' interfere with
our interpretation of the copyright laws." 412 U.S. 546, 576, 579 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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which divests the producer or performer of his common law rights in
the recording." Indeed, this would appear to be the prevailing treatment afforded the publication issue under state law." In contrast, the
commercial distribution of sound recordings has uniformly been held
52
to constitute a divestive publication under the federal rule.
Since a finding that publication has occurred in any particular
case will depend on whether the state or federal definition is applied,
a significant preliminary inquiry is whether the test of publication is
a state or federal question. The Supreme Court in Goldstein appears
to have adopted the view that as to those "writings" which have been
brought within the scope of the Copyright Act, publication is a federal matter, but as to those works not subject to the statutory copyright, publication is of no federal concern. 3 Against this approach
must be contrasted the view of Judge Learned Hand, an important
molder of modern copyright law. Hand was the leading proponent of
the theory that as to any constitutional "writing" within the meaning
of the copyright clause, publication must be considered a matter of
federal law.54 Hand's reasoning flowed from his belief that the language of the copyright clause vesting in Congress the power to grant
copyright protection for "limited times" only55 applies both to Congress and to the states. Therefore perpetual state protection in the
'See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.
1955) (applying New York law); Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C. 1939)
(applying North Carolina law); Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Misc.2d 1034, 155
N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols
Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Waring v. WDAS
Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937). Cf. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956)
(general distribution of a film does not destroy performer's common law rights in the
film; applying New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware law). But see
Mercury Recording Products, Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 181 U.S.P.Q. 105
(Wis. Cir. Ct. 1974).
5
'NIMMER § 51.1.
5
See, e.g., RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 712 (1940); McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958);
Granz v. Harris, 98 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), modified, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir.
1952); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
1412 U.S. at 570 n.28. Having adopted this view, the Goldstein Court was thus
able to validate state protection of the statutorily uncopyrightable sound recordings
at issue before it without having to consider, except in passing, the publication question.
5
See Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM. L.
REv. 49, 51-53 (1969); Kurlantzick, The Constitutionalityof State Law Protectionof
Sound Recordings, 5 CONN. L. Rv. 204, 217-22 (1972). See generally Cracas, Judge
Learned Hand and the Law of Copyright, 7 A.S.C.A.P. 55 (1956).
'See notes 14 and 48 supra.
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guise of common law copyright cannot be permitted since such a
result would contravene this constitutional limitation. 6 In order to
prevent this possibility of unlimited state protection, Hand argued
that the publication of any constitutional writing, whether or not
copyrightable under the federal statute,57 must be tested by the federal rule, which deems public distribution of the work to constitute a
publication thereof. 5 It was largely on this point that Hand rested his
dissent in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp." He agreed
with the majority that sound recordings are "writings" in the constitutional sense, but that they were not, at the time, copyrightable
under the Copyright Act. However, he disagreed with the majority's
-Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664, 667 (2d Cir.
1955) (Hand, J., dissenting).
5
Speaking for the majority in RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940), Hand concluded that there is "no reason why the
same acts that unconditionally dedicate the common-law copyright in works copyrightable under the act, should not do the same in the case of works not copyrightable."
Id. at 89.
'Hand was also concerned that permitting a state to define publication as to those
writings which are not copyrightable under the Act would, in light of the more limiting
federal definition of publication, discriminate against those writings which had been
brought within the scope of the federal statute. He felt that it would be a "perverse
anomaly" if the statutory grant of copyright protection should in this manner operate
to the detriment of the author's interests, while the non-inclusion of certain classes of
writings within the scope of the Copyright Act could "be a bonanza to those who
possessed property of that kind." Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC,
114 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1940), af'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
'221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955). Capitol Records had been granted the exclusive right
to reproduce and distribute records made from certain master recordings owned by the
grantee Telefunken, a German company. Mercury Records claimed its right to reproduce and sell the same recordings under a license from a Czechoslovakian alien-property
administrator who had seized the master recordings from a Czechoslovakian grantee
of Telefunken. Concluding that Capitol Records had to "succeed on the strength of its
own title rather than the weakness of defendant's," id. at 662, the majority turned to
a consideration of whether Capitol's sale of the recordings had constituted a divestive
publication. Since jurisdiction was predicated upon diversity, the majority was compelled by the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), to apply New York
law to the issue of publication. Acknowledging that the test of publication announced
in RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88-89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712
(1940) (public distribution constitutes divestive publication), would, if applicable, bar
Capitol's claim to common law rights in the recordings, the majority nevertheless held
that a later New York decision, Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder
Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), afl'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951), had overruled the Whiteman case and that under Metropolitan
Opera, Capitol's public sale of the recordings did not divest its common law interest
in them. 221 F.2d at 663. In contrast, Hand's dissent argued that the question of
publication was a matter of federal law and that the holding of Whiteman should be
applied as representing the federal rule. Id. at 666-67.
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conclusion that the omission of recordings from the scope of the Act
meant that their issue of publication was properly a state question."
Hand's dissenting opinion in Capitol Records represents perhaps
his most lucid analysis of the interaction of the "limited times" provision with the issue of publication of sound recordings. In that case,
he argued that to permit the states to grant perpetual protection by
applying their own unrealistic definition of publication would "pro
tanto defeat the overriding purpose of the [copyright] Clause, which
was to grant only for 'limited Times' the untrammelled exploitation
of an author's 'Writings'."'" A federal definition is demanded by the
very language of the clause, which, in Hand's view, operates ex proprio vigore to impose the "limited times" restriction on the states.
However, Hand was also quick to point out that the federal authority
to define publication, since it flows from the copyright clause of the
Constitution, extends only to those works which are "writings" within
the term's constitutional meaning. Thus the states are "free to follow
their own notions as to when an author's right shall be unlimited both
in user and in duration"62 as to those works which are not constitutional "writings." Once it is determined, however, that the work falls
within the purview of that constitutional term, the question of publication then becomes a matter of exclusive federal competence. 3
Under the Hand approach, the extension of federal statutory copyright protection to sound recordings by the Sound Recording
Amendment of 197164 should have little effect upon the scope of the
state common law copyright in them. It is now clear beyond a doubt
that sound recordings are "writings" within the constitutional meaning of the term.65 Applying Hand's analysis, it follows that since
sound recordings are "writings," the question of their publication is
a federal issue. This is true regardless of whether the recordings were
fixed prior to February 15, 1972, and thus fall outside the scope of the
Amendment or whether they were fixed on or after that date and are
60Id. at 664-68.
"Id. at 667. See note 14 supra.
12221 F.2d at 667.
'Note that Hand was not arguing that exclusive federal authority on the issue of
publication was a matter of statutory preemption. Indeed, he agreed with the majority
that, as of 1955, recordings were not subject to copyright under the federal statute. His
argument instead was premised on the notion that federal preemption of the issue was
dictated by the force of the copyright clause itself. Therefore, since sound recordings
are "writings" in the constitutional sense, it follows that the question of their publication is an exclusively federal one.
G'See note 3 supra.
'See note 19 supra.
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therefore subject to the statutory copyright;68 the crucial question
under the Hand approach is whether the work is a constitutional
"writing." However, it appears that in its treatment of the common
law copyright-publication question in Goldstein,67 the Supreme
Court has rejected the Hand approach, adopting instead the view
that publication is a state question as to any category of writings not
subject to a federal copyright.
One of the arguments raised by the Goldstein pirates against the
validity of the California anti-piracy statute was that it purported to
extend protection to recordings even after they are "published"
within the federal meaning of that term. The pirates contended that
therefore the statute could not be upheld as a valid exercise of the
power to protect unpublished writings which is reserved to the states
by § 2 of the Copyright Act. 8 This argument rests upon the implied
premise that the protection of constitutional "writings," whether
published or unpublished, is a matter of exclusive federal power, 9 the
states having no inherent common law authority regarding unpublished "writings." Thus any authority to protect unpublished writings which the states may possess is only that which Congress has
expressly granted them by statutory enactment-particularly § 2 of
the Copyright Act." This, however, does not represent the prevailing
view. Section 2 has never been interpreted as the source of state
"See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
67412 U.S. 546 (1973).
"Id. at 551. The thrust of the pirates' argument goes to the invalidity of the
California statute as a matter of federal preemption. Bound up with this argument was
the pirates' additional contention, implied in the majority's opinion, that even if the
statute were to be held valid, their conviction under the statute should be overturned
since all of the particular recordings at issue had been published and had therefore
entered the public domain. Id. This latter contention thus goes to the validity of the
conviction in light of the specific facts of the case and not to the issue of the constitutionality of the statute itself. However, since the Goldstein Court upheld the statute
as applied to pre-Amendment sound recordings, regardless of whether they had been
"published" under state law, it did not have to reach this latter contention.
"This notion is in turn based upon Hand's view of the self-generated preemptive
effect of the copyright clause. See notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra.
"This section provides:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of
the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or
in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor.
17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). This section may be viewed as an express grant of authority to
the states in an area where, due to the preemptive effect of the copyright clause, they
would otherwise not have authority to act. This, however, is not the interpretation
which has been ascribed to it. See text accompanying note 71 infra.
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power to protect unpublished works. Instead, it has been consistently
viewed as simply a congressional disclaimer of any attempt to
preempt the states' inherent common law authority to deal with
works before publication." It follows from this view of inherent state
powers that, as to those categories of writings not included within the
scope of the Copyright Act, the states may by exercising their common law authority determine their own structure of pre-publication
protection independently of the federal scheme. The exercise of this
power by the states would of course include applying their own definition of "publication."
The Supreme Court in Goldstein appears to have adopted this
view of inherent state power. Having concluded that the pre-Sound
Recording Amendment records involved in the case were not within
the purview of the Copyright Act, the Court addressed the question
of their publication:
Petitioners place great stress on their belief that the records or
tapes which they copied had been "published." We have no
need to determine whether, under state law, these recordings
had been published or what legal consequences such publication might have. For purposes of federal law, "publication"
serves only as a term of the art which defines the legal relationships which Congress has adopted under the federal copyright
statutes. As to categories of writings which Congress has not
brought within the scope of the federal statute, the term has
7
no application. 1
The language clearly rejects the Hand view that, as to all categories of constitutional "writings," the publication question is an exclusively federal one. Instead, the Court has redrawn the federal-state
line of demarcation: a federal definition of publication is appropriate
in relation to those categories of "writings" which have been brought
within the protective scope of the Federal Copyright Act. However,
if Congress has seen fit to exclude from the Act a particular category
of otherwise constitutionally copyrightable writings, then the states
are free to develop their own independently derived tests of publication as to these excluded categories.7 1 In addition, as a constitutional
7

"Kurlantzick, The Constitutionality of State Law Protection of Sound
Recordings, 5 CONN. L. REv. 204, 220-21 & n.59 (1972).
7412 U.S. at 570 n.28 (original emphasis).
"Having rejected the Hand approach which would draw the line between "writings" and non-"writings," with the states' authority to define publication limited to
the non-"writings" side of the line, the Court was compelled to reach the conclusion
it did, this being the only other viable solution. While Hand's premise-that the
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matter, the states are free to protect works which are not constitutional "writings." 74 Thus after Goldstein, the states may control all
of the incidents of common law rights-including defining the crucial
term "publication"-as to those categories of works which are not
"writings" in the constitutional sense and as to those constitutional
"writings" which have not been made the subject of a federal statutory copyright. It is only as to a third class, constitutional "writings"
which have been brought within the purview of the Copyright Act,
that a federal definition is required in order to maintain the integrity
of the federal copyright scheme.
This reservation to the states of the authority to define the parameters of protection for non-"writings" and statutorily uncopyrightable "writings" raises, however, the problem which led Hand to argue
for a federal definition of publication: the possibility that the states
will grant perpetual protection. Hand felt that protection of unlimited duration, whether federal or state, is prohibited by the "limited
times" provision of the copyright clause. In contrast, the Goldstein
Court did not find the possibility of temporally unlimited protection
a bar to the exercise of state power. 7 Turning first to an analysis of
the language of the copyright clause itself,76 the Court found that
copyright clause preempts of its own effect-may be arguable, the same can hardly be
said of the preemptive effect of the statute enacted pursuant to that clause, for here
Congress has clearly exercised the power vested in it. And because, as to those categories of writings enumerated in the Act, publication represents the dividing line between
common law rights and the federally granted copyright, it is necessary to apply a
federal definition of publication in order fully to effectuate the congressional scheme
of protection. Having concluded that there is no inference of federal preemption to be
drawn as to those categories of constitutional "writings" which have not been included
in the Copyright Act (e.g. the Goldstein sound recordings), the Court was then able to
assign the power to define publication of these writings to the states without fear that
an unduly narrow definition would conflict with the federal scheme of protection.
7
This conclusion proceeds from the language of the copyright clause itself which
grants Congress the power to provide copyright protection only to "writings." Although
this term is construed broadly, NIMMER § 8.1, and sound recordings have now been
conclusively recognized as "writings," see note 19 supra, there are some products of
intellectual creation whose status remains unclear. These include ideas, titles, systems
and three dimensional objects. NIMMER §§ 8.4-8.6. However, state protection of these
works, while not limited by the copyright clause, nevertheless remains subject to the
constraints of the first amendment. Thus the scope of the state protection is not
entirely unfettered. See id. at §§ 9-9.24; Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the
Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 49, 79-91 (1969).
"sThe editor's prefatory note to an unofficial publication of the Goldstein decision
in the Bulletin of the Copyright Society described the Court's reasoning as "rather
baffling and unorthodox." 20 BULL. CR. Soc. 345 (1973). This comment could well
apply to the Court's treatment of this limited times issue.
7
See the text of the clause quoted at note 14 supra.
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"[r]ead literally . . .[the copyright clause] enumerates those powers which have been granted to Congress; whatever limitations have
been appended to such powers can only be understood as a limit on
congressional, and not state, action." Hence, strictly as a matter of
constitutional construction, there is nothing in the language of the
clause which compels the conclusion that the granting of protection
by the states must be of limited duration. Nevertheless, there would
appear to be sound reasons why, as a matter of policy, the states
should be bound by the "limited times" restriction, if for no other
reason than to prevent the "perverse anomaly" that statutorily uncopyrightable writings would receive a greater measure of protection
than would those which have been brought within the purview of the
7
Copyright Act. 1
However, in its analysis of the policy implications of the "limited
times" question, the Goldstein Court found no reason so to restrict
state-granted protection, noting that the considerations which mandate that a federal copyright be limited in duration do not apply with
equal force to the states. 9 Particularly, the Court pointed to the
limited geographic effect of state-granted protection, as opposed to
the nationwide scope of a federal copyright. In the Court's view, the
jurisdictional limits inherent in state-granted protection obviate the
need to impose a durational limitation:
When Congress grants an exclusive right or monopoly, its effects are pervasive; no citizen or State may escape its
reach. . . .[H]owever, the exclusive right granted by a State
is confined to its borders. Consequently, even when the right
is unlimited in duration, any tendency to inhibit further progress in science or the arts in narrowly circumscribed."
The Goldstein decision therefore provides a guide for an analysis
74 12 U.S. at 560 (original emphasis).
"See note 58 supra.
"7The basic rationale underlying the temporal limitation on copyright protection
reflected in the "limited times" provision has been explained as:
an attempt to strike a balance between two competing interests: the
interest of authors in the fruits of their labor on the one hand, and on
the other, the interest of the public in ultimately claiming free access
to the materials essential to the development of society.
NIMMER § 5.4. This is also the notion which justifies the rule that publication divests
common law copyright. Id. § 48. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the
primary purpose of copyright is to serve the societal good and not simply to reward
the author. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
"412 U.S. at 560-61. While the Court directed this language specifically to the
issue of the temporally unlimited protection provided by California's anti-piracy penal
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of the status of state common law copyright protection of sound recordings since the enactment of the Sound Recording Amendment.
First, as to those sound recordings fixed on or after February 15, 1972,
and thus amenable to federal copyright protection, the states may
continue to grant pre-publication common law copyright protection.
However, this protection is subject to divestiture by a federally defined act of publication. Thus, the authorized public distribution of
these recordings will, by application of the federal rule, 8 operate both
to divest the common law copyright and either invest the statutory
copyright or place the recording into the public domain.12 On the
other hand, pre-Amendment sound recordings, not subject to a federal copyright, will be afforded common law copyright protection up
to the point of a state-defined publication. Since the prevailing state
definition does not view the public distribution of a recording as
constituting a divestive publication," these rcordings may be afforded common law copyright protection, potentially unlimited in
duration, while at the same time being extensively commercially exploited. Of course such a result is by no means inevitable since a state
may choose to define publication in a manner similar to the federal
approach. Nevertheless, the Goldstein decision clearly approves the
virtually perpetual common law copyright protection of preAmendment sound recordings afforded by the prevailing state definition of publication. 4
Unfair Competition/State Statutory Protection
The decision in Goldstein reflects a conception of the common law
copyright doctrine which vests in the states broad authority. Howstatute, the reasoning is equally applicable to the question of the validity of permitting
a state to define "publication," thereby allowing common law copyright of unlimited
duration. This reasoning applies only to non-"writings" and "writings" not subject to
statutory copyright. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
""Authorized public distribution" or "commercial distribution" appears to be the
generally accepted federal test of publication of sound recordings. See note 52 and
accompanying text supra.
87rhis depends on whether the statutory formalities of registration and notice have
been complied with. For a general discussion of these requirements, see B. RINGER &
P. GITLIN, COPYRIGHTS 32-51 (rev. ed. 1965). For a discussion specifically relating to
sound recordings, see Keziah, Registration Problems Encountered by the Copyright
Office Under the Recent Sound Recording Amendment, 20 BULL. CR. Soc. 3 (1972).
'See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
'"The proposed general Copyright Revision Bill, S.1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301
(1973), would strip the states of their authority to grant common law copyright protection to any category of writing which is subject to a federal statutory copyright under
§ 102 of the proposed Bill, including sound recordings. Id. at § 102(a)(7). Under § 301,
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ever, since the linchpin of the common law copyright power remains
the definition of publication, the state courts often become immeshed
in an unseemly effort to rationalize a rather unrealistic and unworkable definition in order to reach a desired result. In contrast, the application of the doctrine of unfair competition involves no such conceptual gymnastics.
State protection of sound recordings based upon the common law
doctrine of unfair competition, or upon its modem day incarnation
in the form of anti-piracy penal statutes, has been widely and successfully invoked. Indeed, as far back as 1904, a theory of unfair
competition was applied in Victor Talking Machine Co. v.
Armstrong," to grant relief against an early pirate. The Armstrong
court found the three traditional elements of an action for unfair
competition present in the case: (1) competition between the parties;
(2) appropriation of plaintiffs valuable business asset; and (3) defendant's fraudulent "passing-off" of the appropriated asset as plaintiff's, thereby unfairly trading on plaintiffs goodwill and confusing
a sound recording would receive federal statutory protection at the moment it is "created" which, in the case of sound recordings, is defined as: "when [the work] is fixed
in a ... phonorecord for the first time." Id. at § 101. Thus under the Revision Bill:
Common law copyright protection for works coming within the scope
of the statute would be abrogated, and the concept of publication
would lose its all-embracing importance as a dividing line between
common law and statutory protection and between both of these forms
of legal protection and the public domain.
H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1967) (from the Report accompanying H.R.
2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), a revision bill substantially identical in its treatment
of common law copyright as the current bill, S. 1361). One of the grounds advanced
for the Revision Bill's elimination of the state common law copyright is to prevent the
perpetual protection which is now afforded to "unpublished" works and to implement
the "limited times" provision of the copyright clause. H.R. REP. No. 83, supra, at 97.
It would seem doubtful that the Goldstein rationalization of perpetual state common
law copyright protection on the basis of the geographical bounds inherent in such
protection will be accepted as a persuasive refutation of this legislative justification
for the elimination of the state-granted common law copyright. However, it appears
that the Goldstein decision will continue to have validity for some time to come
inasmuch as it is unlikely that the Revision Bill will be enacted within the immediate
future. Kaul, And Now, State Protection of Intellectual Property?, 60 A.B.A.J. 198,
202 (1974). This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that a bill has been recently
introduced into Congress, H.R. 13364, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1974), which would
extend the life of the Sound Recording Amendment. See note 131 infra. Since the
Amendment as originally enacted was to expire January 1, 1975, the clear implication
of the extension bill is that it is not anticipated that the comprehensive Copyright
Revision Bill will have received favorable action by that time.
-132 F. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1904).
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the public as to the source of the product. 8 However, only five years
later in Fonotipia Ltd. v. Bradley 7 injunctive relief was granted
against a pirate despite the absence of the passing-off element. 8 The
court in Fonotipia held that equitable relief could be afforded for
misappropriation of the plaintiff's valuable property even though
there was no intentional deception of the public as to the origin of
the recordings. This elimination of the passing-off component of unfair competition was to receive Supreme Court approval nine years
later in the landmark case of InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press.89
The Court in I.N.S. affirmed an order prohibiting I.N.S. from
distributing news releases which were either verbatim or rewritten
copies of earlier dispatches released by the Associated Press. The
Court rejected the contention by I.N.S. that "[ulpon publication,
the news becomes the common possession of all to whom it is accessible."90 Instead, the Court found that A.P. had a "quasi-property"
interest in its news releases which, while perhaps not valid as against
the public at large, was nevertheless enforceable as against a competitor such as I.N.S.9 1 I.N.S. had sold the appropriated news releases
under its own name and thus had not engaged in the passing-off
activity which had traditionally been thought to be a requisite element of an unfair competition action. 2 Nevertheless, the I.N.S.
"Id. See STUDIES at 135; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 711-12 (1938); Chafee, Unfair
Competition, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1289 (1940); Note, The Future of Record Piracy, 38
BROOK. L. REv. 406, 415 (1971); Comment, The MisappropriationDoctrineAfter SearsCompco, 2 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 292, 295 (1968).
"7171 F. 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1909).
"The defendant in that case had advertised his recordings as duplications of the
plaintiff's originals, thus obviating the charge that he was misleading the public by
passing-off the recordings as plaintiffs. Id.
-248 U.S. 215 (1918).
"Id. at 218. Indeed, the Court specifically distinguished the case before it from
those decided on the basis of common law rights and thus rejected the argument of a
divestive "publication":
[Ilt seems to us the case must turn upon the question of unfair
competition in business. And, in our opinion, this does not depend
upon any general right of property analogous to the common-law right
of the proprietor of an unpublished work to prevent its publication
without his consent . . . .We are dealing here not with restrictions
upon publication but with the very facilities and processes of publication.
Id. at 235.
"Id. at 236.
"Speaking of the absence of the passing-off component of the traditional unfair
competition case, the Court made it clear that such passing-off was no longer required
to grant relief:
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Court upheld the injunction, condemning what it characterized as:
an unauthorized interference with the normal operation of
complainant's legitimate business precisely at the point where
the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a material portion
of the profit from those who have earned it to those who have
not; with special advantage to defendant in the competition
because of the fact that it is not burdened with any part of the
3
expense of gathering news.1
Thus the LN.S. decision established that relief could be granted
merely on a showing of misappropriation by a competitor with no
need to prove passing-off. 4 In this sense, therefore, I.N.S. represented
a broadening of the traditional notions of unfair competition. However, later lower court decisions largely limited the case to its facts."
As might be expected, Judge Learned Hand was in the vanguard of
those who opposed the application of the broad theory of misappropriation announced in I.N.S. 6 As in the case of state-granted common law copyright,97 Hand's objection to an overly-broad application
of the misappropriation doctrine was premised upon a theory of constitutional preemption. To permit the states to grant what is in essence copyright protection under the rubric of misappropriation
would, in Hand's view, allow for perpetual state protection under this
theory and would run counter to the policy of uniformity implicit in
the copyright clause. 8 Thus in Radio Corporationof America ManuIt is said that the elements of unfair competition are lacking
because there is no attempt by defendant to palm off its goods as those
of the complainant, characteristic of the most familiar, if not the most
typical, cases of unfair competition ....

But we cannot concede that

the right to equitable relief is confined to that class of cases.
Id. at 241-42.
"Id. at 240.
9The I.N.S. Court highlighted this distinction when it pointed out that by taking
and selling A.P.'s work product as its own, I.N.S. merely substituted "misappropriation in the place of misrepresentation." And in the Court's view, either type of activity
would warrant the grant of equitable relief. Id. at 242. See also note 92 supra.
5
STUDIES at 136. But see Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433,
194 A. 631 (1937) (applying common law copyright as ground for granting relief to
performer for unauthorized broadcasts of recordings embodying his performances, but
discussing unfair competition as an alternate basis for decision).
"See, e.g., G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952); RCA Mfg.
Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940); Millinery
Creators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1940); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk
Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
7
See notes 54-63 and accompanying text supra.
"See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664, 667 (2d
Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., dissenting).
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facturing Co. v. Whiteman," Hand, writing for the majority, held
that mere misappropriation, without more, would not justify relief.
In 1950, however, despite Hand's efforts, the misappropriation
doctrine received further expansion by a New York state court in
Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder
Corp.' In that case, the court applied the LN.S. misappropriation
doctrine to grant injunctive relief against a record pirate in favor of
the recording artists whose performances were embodied in the pirated recordings. In so doing, the court had dispensed with yet another
of the traditional elements of an action for unfair competition: the
requirement that the parties actually be competitors.,' The combined effect of the Metropolitan Opera decision and the Supreme
Court's holding in I.N.S. was to establish the mere act of misappropriation as a basis for relief. Thus, the concept of unfair competition,
initially formulated for application in a limited commercial context,
had been transformed into a doctrine of simple misappropriation
which represented a right enforceable as against the whole world. In
this way, the misappropriation doctrine became the functional equivalent of a copyright."I It was but a short step from this broad formulation of the misappropriation doctrine to the kind of state anti-piracy
penal statute, such as that at issue in Goldstein, which extends to the
sound recording owner protection against any unauthorized duplication of his work.
It was this transformation of unfair competition from a doctrine
limited in application and scope to one providing copyright-like protection which prompted Hand to write his prophetic dissent in the
1955 case of Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp.0 3 The
29114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
00199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd mem., 279 App. Div. 632,
107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951). The pirate in this case raised the argument that the radio
broadcast of the recordings constituted a publication which divested any rights in
them. Although the court refuted this argument by analogy to the rule announced in
Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912) (public performance of a play does not constitute divestive publication), it nevertheless predicated its decision on the LN.S. view
that the concept of publication has no relevancy in the application of the misappropriation doctrine.
"'The basis of this assertion lies in the fact that the court granted relief in favor
of the performers and against the pirate-parties who could hardly be called competitors. While this reading of the case is somewhat weakened by the fact that Columbia
Records, Metropolitan's licensee, intervened in the case, nevertheless the court pointed
out that "the existence of actual competition between the parties is no longer a prerequisite" to an action for unfair competition. 199 Misc. at 795, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 491-92.
"'2See Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 CoLU1,o. L.
REv. 49, 58 (1969).
'221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
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case raised the issue of publication in the context of a dispute be4
tween two assignees of rights in several recordings." Hand's dissent
restated his theory of constitutional preemption of the copyright
field. He argued that state protection of constitutional "writings"
which is the equivalent of copyright protection is preempted by the
sheer force of the copyright clause alone, irrespective of whether they
are copyrightable under the Act. Thus, Hand concluded, the potentially unlimited protection afforded by such state law doctrines as
common law copyright and misappropriation must be limited by the
05
act of publication, federally defined. In Hand's view, only in this
manner could the two-fold constitutional policies of limited protection and national uniformity be effectuated.'
Hand's dissent in Capitol Records foreshadowed the Supreme
Court's treatment of the federal preemption question raised in the
1964 landmark companion cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co. ' 7 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.' Both cases
"' See notes 59-63 and accompanying text supra for a fuller discussion of the case
in the context of the common law copyright issue.
'05As one commentator has pointed out, Hand was not opposed to all state law
theories which granted protection akin to copyright. For example, in RCA Mfg. Co. v.
Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940), while denying-on
the basis of New York's law of negative covenants-bandleader Paul Whiteman the
authority to restrict the broadcast use of his recordings (to which were affixed the label
"Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast") once they had been publicly distributed, Hand
nevertheless noted that the broadcasts might reach radios in Pennsylvania and that
under that state's rule of equitable servitude, "it will constitute a tort committed
there." Id. at 89-90. Thus Hand was able to accept those state law rules which touch
only peripherally upon the copyright interest such as negative servitude, negative
covenant and interference with contract. However, when, as in the case of common law
copyright and misappropriation, the state rule becomes substantially identical to copyright in the nature and scope of the protection it affords, it must be subject to the
preemptory mandates of "limited times" and uniformity embodied in the Constitution. See Goldstein, FederalSystem Ordering of the CopyrightInterest, 69 COLUM. L.
Rxv. 49, 55-61 (1969).
" 8Note that even under Hand's formulation, the states would still retain exclusive
authority over those works not "writings" within the constitutional meaning of the
term. This follows logically from Hand's view of the preemptive effect of the copyright
clause, which is expressly limited by its terms to "writings." However, Hand would
apply this preemption to all "writings" within the constitutional meaning of that term,
and not just those which Congress has brought within the purview of the Federal Act.
This was the crucial point of divergence in Capitol Records between Hand and the
majority.
1-376 U.S. 225 (1964).
1-376 U.S. 234 (1964). Both cases involved substantially identical facts. Each case
involved a particular item, pole lamps in Sears and overhead lighting fixtures in
Compco, the design of which had been registered for a federal design patent. Both
actions were for infringement of these design patents by defendants who had manufac-
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presented the issue of whether a state could grant protection against
copying, under the doctrine of unfair competition, to an item not
protectible under the federal design patent statute. The language of
the decisions was cast in broad terms and purported to address the
entire problem of federal preemption in the fields of both patents and
copyrights.' The Court held that the federal patent and copyright
laws,
like other laws of the United States enacted pursuant to constitutional authority, are the supreme law of the land ...
When state law touches upon the area of these federal statutes,
it is "familiar doctrine" that the federal policy "may not be set
at naught, or its benefits denied" by the state law."'
Two of these federal policies which the Court pointed to, as had Hand
nine years earlier, were the need to set a time limit upon the duration
of the patent or copyright monopoly"' and the requirement of uniformity demanded by a rational system of national protection."'
However, unlike Hand's approach, the Court in Sears-Compco
predicated its finding of federal preemption not so much upon a
theory of constitutional imperative, but more upon a theory of broad
tured virtually identical copies of the original items and who had sold them under their
own names. And in both cases the lower courts had declared the design patent invalid,
but had nevertheless granted relief on the basis of the state law of unfair competition.
The only appreciable factual distinction between the two cases was that in Compco,
there was evidence in the record indicating that there had been at least one incident
where a purchaser of the defendant's copy had been confused by its similarity to the
original. Id. at 236-37. There was no such evidence of public confusion in the other case.
However, the Court did not consider this difference significant and treated both cases
as presenting the same issues. Id.
"'At least one commentator has suggested that the weakness of the Sears-Compco
decisions is a result of the broadness of the language used by the Court. Schrader,
Sound Recordings: Protection Under State Law and Under the Recent Amendment to
the Copyright Code, 14 ARIz. L. REv. 689, 700 (1972).
"'376 U.S. at 229 (citations omitted).
"'On this "limited times" issue, the Court found that when a patent expires or
when the item is denied federal protection entirely, it is intended to pass into the
public domain. To permit perpetual state protection of these federally unprotected
items "would be too great an encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated." Id. at 232.
"'Regarding this issue of uniformity, the Court found a congressional intent to
establish a uniform federal system of copyright protection evidenced in such statutes
as 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1970), which vests in the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
to hear patent and copyright cases and in § 2 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 2
(1970), "which expressly saves state protection of unpublished writings but does not
include published writings .... " 376 U.S. at 231 n.7.
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statutory preemption." 3
Thus under the Sears-Compco analysis, potential state activity in
the copyright field is preempted in two senses. First, as to those
writings protectable under a federal statutory copyright the provisions of the Copyright Act represent the limits of available protection.
The states are precluded from granting to these writings protection
which has the effect of extending the federal protection of the copyright interest. Second, the federal statute has an additional negative
preemptive effect. The remaining constitutional "writings" which
have not been brought within the scope of the Act are intended by
Congress to be free of any protection whatsoever. Therefore state law
cannot be used to provide protection for this group of "writings" since
such protection would place restrictions upon that which Congress
had decided should be openly and freely available to the public.,"
The import of this preemption reasoning in respect to sound recordings is clear. Although recordings were not extended federal copyright
protection until the enactment of the Sound Recording Amendment,
nevertheless by the time of the Sears and Compco decisions they had
been recognized as constitutional "writings." Thus, had the SearsCompco doctrine of federal preemption been applied to its fullest
extent in subsequent record piracy cases, no state relief would have
been available against the practices of record pirates.
"'The Court did, however, acknowledge that this statutory preemption flowed
from and was the result of the constitutional policies:
[Wlhen an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law
may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid copying would
interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl.8, of the
Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing
free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain.
Id. at 237 (emphasis added). That the Court's decision rested upon a premise of
statutory rather than constitutional preemption is evident in its reliance on the federal
patent and copyright statutes, and the legislative intent reflected therein, regarding
the "limited times" and uniformity questions. See notes 111-12 supra.
"'In formulating its theory of federal preemption, the Court also indicated two
areas with which it indicated that the states were still competent to deal. The first was
the pre-publication common law copyright, 376 U.S. at 231 n.7, although the Court
did not address itself to the issue of whether publication is a state or federal question.
However, had it done so, and in light of its reasoning expressed in the cases, the Court
undoubtedly would have come down on the federal side. The other area expressly
reserved to the states by the Sears-Compco Court was the authority to "require that
goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary steps
be taken to prevent customers from being mislead as to the source [of the goods]."
Id. at 232. Clearly, however, this authority does not reach the heart of the copyright
power, but is rather directed merely at preventing public confusion. Thus, this reservation of authority to the states is consistent with the general thrust of the decisions.
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However, as was predicted after the decisions in Sears and
Compco, 115 the lower courts were less than willing to effectuate fully
the apparent preemptive mandate of the two Supreme Court cases.
One commentator has speculated that it was judicial revulsion to the
predatory practices of pirates and the desire to avoid leaving the
recording industry defenseless which motivated the courts to circumvent the full impact of Sears and Compco."I The device used to
distinguish the two decisions was the "copying-misappropriation"
distinction."7 The first in a series of cases to articulate and apply this
distinction was Capitol Records, Inc. v. GreatestRecords, Inc. " The
case presented the archetypal record piracy situation in which the
defendant pirate had directly duplicated recorded performances by
the Beatles. The original recordings had been released through Capitol Records, the plaintiff. The defendant asserted the Sears-Compco
preemption doctrine, arguing that state protection could not be afforded under the rubric of unfair competition since the recordings
were "writings" not subject to protection under federal law. The
court, in rejecting this argument, reasoned that the Supreme Court's
decisions dealt with the copying of items not subject to federal protection and thus only barred state protection designed to prevent such
copying. This copying was distinguished by the court from the activities of record pirates which involve the direct duplicating (dubbing)
of sound recordings. It was the court's view that Sears and Compco
addressed only the issue of copying and did not reach the type of
misappropriation which such direct duplication entails. Accordingly,
the court concluded that the Sears-Compco doctrine does not
preempt state laws which operate to prevent direct reproduction of
recordings." 9 Therefore, it was held that under the I.N.S.
misappropriation doctrine the defendant pirate had directly and unfairly appropriated the plaintiff's creation and that state law relief
was appropriate. 2 '
"'See Price, The Moral Judge and the Copyright Statute: The Problem of Stiffel
and Compco, 14 A.S.C.A.P. 90, 114 (1966).
"'See Schrader, Sound Recordings: Protection Under State Law and Under the
Recent Amendment to the Copyright Code, 14 ARIz. L. REv. 689, 699 (1972).
"'See generally Note, The "Copying - Misappropriation"Distinction:A False
Step in the Development of the Sears-Compco Pre-emption Doctrine, 71 COLUi. L.
REv. 1444 (1971).
"'43 Misc.2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Accord, Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Cartridge City, Ltd., 35 C.O. Bull. 87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
"'43 Misc.2d 878, 879-80, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555-56 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
"'Although the impact of the I.N.S. decision was substantially weakened by the
rule announced in the Erie case, nevertheless the I.N.S. misappropriation doctrine has
served, either implicitly or explicitly, as the basic rationale of the copying-
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The copying-misappropriation distinction was seized upon by
many other courts in subsequent record piracy cases as a means of
avoiding the preemptive effect of Sears and Compco.'1' However,
while the adoption of the misappropriation theory was widespread,
it was by no means unanimous. Several courts simply rejected the
copying-misappropriation distinction as an artificial one, holding
that state unfair competition laws could not be invoked against record pirates because of the bar of federal preemption raised by Sears
and Compco.'" Still other courts purported to find statutory grounds
within the Copyright Act itself for granting relief against pirates,
thereby providing protection while avoiding the preemption prob23
lem.
misappropriation line of cases. The Sears-Compco Court's failure expressly to overrule
LN.S. permitted its invocation in the copying-misappropriation context. However,
several recent cases have taken the view that Sears-Compcoimplicitly overruled LN.S.
See CBS, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967); Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV,
Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964); Time Saver Check, Inc. v. Deluxe Check Printers,
Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. 510 (N.D. Tex. 1973); International Tape Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gerstein,
344 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1972); cf. Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972).
'See, e.g., Tape Indus. Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal.
1970); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App.3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 47, 164
U.S.P.Q. 465 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Baez v. Fantasy Records, Inc., 144 U.S.P.Q. 537
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1964); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 167 U.S.P.Q. 489 (Ill. App.
1970); CBS, Inc. v. Spies, 167 U.S.P.Q. 492 (I1. Cir. Ct. 1970); Greater Recording Co.,
Inc. v. Stambler, 144 U.S.P.Q. 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); LibertylU.A., Inc. v. Eastern
Tape Corp., 11 N.C. App. 20, 180 S.E.2d 414 (1971).
'2See Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 488
(D.N.J. 1973) (on motion for summary judgment); Jondora Music Publishing Co. v.
Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.J. 1973) (on motion for relief from writ
of seizure); International Tape Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla.
1972).
'This somewhat unusual theory of protection against piracy was applied by the
Ninth Circuit in Duchess Music Corp. v. Stem, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 847 (1972). The court's decision was based upon a construction of the compulsory license provision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970). That section
provides that whenever the owner of a copyright in a musical composition authorizes
the recording of that composition, "any other person may make similar use of the
copyrighted work" upon filing of notice and payment of the statutory royalty. The
court focused on the words "similar use" in its construction of the statute. Relying
upon language in Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926, 927 (W.D.N.Y.
1912), the Ninth Circuit found that record pirates did not make a "similar use" of the
musical composition within the meaning of the statute-rather they made an exact
use. A "similar use" of the kind contemplated by the statute would, according to the
court, require the would-be pirate to hire his own musicians and produce his own,
independent recording of the musical composition. 458 F.2d at 1311. Upon this reasoning, the Duchess court concluded that the unauthorized direct reproduction of sound
recordings infringes the statutory copyright of the composer, or his licensee, in the
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Of the group of post-Sears-Compco record piracy cases, perhaps
the most significant ones in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Goldstein are Tape Industries Association of America v. Younger,"4
a California district court case involving the same anti-piracy statute
attacked in Goldstein, and InternationalTape ManufacturersAssociation v. Gerstein.'25 At issue in both cases was the authority of a
state to grant protection to sound recordings through the device of
penal statutes criminalizing record piracy.2 8 Although this type of
protection differs in form from that provided by the doctrine of misappropriation, the essential copyright-like nature of the two modes
of protection remains the same. Thus the Younger court was able to
invoke the copying-misappropriation distinction normally associated
with the civil law of unfair competition to uphold the state criminal
law protection. The court reasoned that the statute prohibited only
the direct duplication of sound recordings, not merely copying or
imitation, and thus remained untouched by the Sears-Compco
underlying musical composition. Accord, Fame Publishing Co. v. S&S Distribs., Inc.,
177 U.S.P.Q. 358 (N.D. Ala. 1973); cf. Liberty/U.A., Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 11
N.C. App. 20, 180 S.E.2d 414 (1971).
This reasoning has been criticized as inconsistent with the prevailing view,
NIMMER § 108.4621, and has been expressly rejected by at least two courts. See cases
cited in note 122 supra.It is also contrary to the congressional view, expressed just piror
to the passage of the Sound Recording Amendment, that if the pirate pays the statutory royalty required by the compulsory license provision, "there is no Federal remedy
currently available to combat the unauthorized reproduction of the recording." H.R.
REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971). It is significant that the Goldstein decision
did not discuss the Duchess reasoning at all, even though virtually all briefs submitted
in opposition to the petitioning pirates relied upon Duchess. Jondora Music Publishing
Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 488, 494 n.1 (D.N.J. 1973). However, the
Goldstein Court may have indicated some approval of the Duchess approach when it
assumed only "arguendo" that record pirates make a "similar use" within the statutory meaning. 412 U.S. at 566 n.23.
Through this door left open by Goldstein has marched the Tenth Circuit in a
recent, post-Goldsteindecision. In Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 181 U.S.P.Q. 129 (10th Cir. 1974), rev'g 357 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Okla. 1973),
the Tenth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Duchess and held that
piracy is not a "similar use" within the meaning of § 1(e) of the Copyright Act. But
see Mercury Recording Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 181 U.S.P.Q. 105
(Wis. Cir. Ct. 1974).
121316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 902 (1971) (appeal
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
12344 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1972), vacated and remanded, 182 U.S.P.Q. 7 (5th
Cir. 1974).
2
The California statute challenged, and upheld, in the Younger case, CAL. PENAL
COnE § 653h (West 1970), was the same one at issue in Goldstein. The Florida statute
challenged in Gerstein, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 543.041 (Supp. 1973-74), is virtually identical to the California statute.
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federal preemption doctrine. '1
When faced with issues similar to those in Younger, the Florida
federal district court in Gerstein reached a contrary result, noting
that Sears and Compco may have "undermined the legality" of the
LN.S.-type of misappropriation theory relied upon in Younger. 2 " In
the Gerstein court's view, "[tihe focus of both Sears and Compco
was the artificial creation [by state law] of patent or copyright protection afforded to [federally] unpatentable or uncopyrightable
works, not the manner in which the works were reproduced."' 2 However, the Gerstein case presented an issue which had not arisen in
Younger-the effect of the then recently enacted Sound Recording
Amendment upon the validity of state anti-piracy statutes, in light
of the preemptive mandate of Sears-Compco.
Since a federal copyright under the Amendment is limited to
recordings fixed on or after February 15, 1972, the Gerstein court
considered the validity of the state statute first as applied to preFebruary 15 sound recordings and then as applied to those recordings
fixed after that date and therefore subject to a federal copyright.'
Regarding pre-Amendment recordings, the enacting clause of the
Amendment expressly states that it is not to "be construed as affecting in any way rights with respect to [pre-Amendment sound recordings]."'' Therefore, it was argued, Congress did not intend to
preempt the holding of those pre-Amendment cases which had
granted relief by application of state law. The court agreed that the
language of the enacting clause "merely retained the status quo as
'The court found nothing in the statute to justify striking it down on the basis of
either constitutional or statutory preemption, concluding that it was a "tolerable and
permissible state regulation . . . and does not unconstitutionally intrude on the Federal policies enunciated in the Copyright Clause. . .and in Federal Copyright legislation . . . ." 316 F. Supp. at 351.
12344 F. Supp. at 49.
111Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
",'The Gerstein case was a class action seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Florida statute and an injunction against its anticipated future enforcement. Thus the court's decision was not limited to a consideration of the validity of
the statute as to a particular group of recordings "fixed" at a particular time, but
rather extended to an analysis of the validity of the statute under any circumstances.
"'The language of the enacting clause is crucial to an analysis of congressional
intent vis-a-vis the question of preemption. The relevant portion of the clause reads:
The provisions of title 17, United States Code, as amended by section
1 of this Act [i.e. the section granting statutory copyright to sound
recordings], shall apply only to sound recordings fixed, published,
and copyrighted on and after [February 15, 1972] and before January
1, 1975, and nothing in title 17, United States Code, as amended by
section 1 of this Act, shall be applied retroactively or be construed as
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existed prior to the enactment of the law."' 32 However, in the court's
view, the dominant feature of this pre-Amendment status quo was
the preemption doctrine of Sears and Compco. Thus while the
Gerstein court conceded that as to sound recordings fixed prior to
February 15, 1972, Congress may not have statutorily preempted all
state anti-piracy laws by enacting the Amendment, nevertheless such
laws are preempted by the judicially created Sears-Compco
doctrine.1'3
Having determined that the Florida anti-piracy statute would be
unconstitutional as applied to pre-Amendment sound recordings, the
Gerstein court then turned to a consideration of the statute vis-a-vis
recordings fixed after the Amendment's effective date. On this point
it was argued that, on their faces, there was no actual conflict between Florida's anti-piracy statute and the Sound Recording Amendment and that therefore "a party would not incur the penalty of the
one by obeying the dictates of the other."' 134 However, in reasoning
similar to that applied earlier by Judge Learned Hand, the court in
Gerstein found two irreconcilable conflicts between the state and
federal statutes: The first of these was the fifty-six year maximum
duration of the federally granted protection as opposed to the perpetual protection afforded by the Florida statute. Second, the court
pointed to the elaborate notice and registration requirements imposed by the federal copyright scheme and the complete absence of
affecting in any way any rights with respect to sound recordings fixed
before [February 15, 1972].
Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3 (Oct. 15, 1971). The reason for the somewhat anomalous cutoff date of January 1, 1975, is that the Amendment was conceived as a stop-gap
measure to deal with the specific problem of record piracy, on the assumption that the
comprehensive Copyright Revision Bill, S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), would
have been enacted by that date. See H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971).
However, in apparent recognifition of the fact that the Revision Bill probably will not
be enacted by the January 1 cut-off date, a bill has been recently introduced into
Congress, H.R. 13364, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1974), which would amend the quoted
language by deleting the phrase "and before January 1, 1975," thus extending the
effective life of the Sound Recording Amendment. The bill would also provide additional penalties for infringement of a copyright in sound recordings obtained under the
Amendment and would stiffen the penalties provided in 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (1970) for
counterfeiting record labels and album covers. See notes 33-34 supra.
3344 F. Supp. at 52. For a contrary analysis of the effect of the Amendment's
language, see NIMMER § 35.225.
'3344 F. Supp. at 52. In effectuating the Sears-Compco preemption doctrine, the
court rejected arguments of the state statute's validity based upon both the copyingmisappropriation distinction, see text at notes 128-29 supra, and the "similar use"
theory applied in the Duchess case, see note 123 supra.
12344 F. Supp. at 54.
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such requirements under the state formulation. 35' Thus the Gerstein
court held the state antipiracy statute invalid as applied to sound
recordings fixed either before or after the effective date of the Sound
Recording Amendment.'38 Yet, despite the apparent persuasiveness of
the Gerstein decision, its holding with respect to the application of
state anti-piracy statutes to pre-Amendment sound recordings appears to have been overruled, at least implicitly,'37 by the Supreme
Court's decision in Goldstein v. California."'
In Goldstein, the Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of several record pirates who had been charged under the same California
anti-piracy statute upheld in Younger' and who had pleaded nolo
contendere to the charges. The pirates attacked the statute on two
11Id. at 54-55. Although the contention was not specifically raised, the court considered the possibility that the Florida statute, by inference, incorporated the federal
time limits and registration requirements. Although the court found no legislative
intent to incorporate these federal requirements into the particular statute at issue and
although the court expressed its uncertainty as to the validity of the statute even had
it incorporated the federal elements, nevertheless the clear implication of the court's
language is that a carefully drawn state anti-piracy statute dealing with postAmendment sound recordings could perhaps pass muster even under the Gerstein
analysis. Id. at 55.
'6In the final portion of its opinion, the Gerstein court considered whether the
Florida statute could stand as a valid law protecting only the common law copyright
interest of the owner of the master recording. Correctly noting that the scope and
effectiveness of the common law copyright is a function of the "publication" test
applied, the court reached the dubious conclusion that there can be no common law
copyright in recorded sounds and that therefore the Florida statute could not be saved
by limiting its scope to pre-publication protection. Id. at 56-57. The court's reasoning
on this point is unclear at best.
'Goldstein's upholding of California's anti-piracy statute as applied to preAmendment sound recordings clearly operates to invalidate Gerstein's holding on this
point although Gerstein is not expressly overruled.
'412 U.S. 546 (1973). The Goldstein Court took pains to point out that since all
of the recordings at issue in the case had been fixed prior to the effective date of the
Amendment, there was no question raised about the power of the states to protect
sound recordings fixed after that date. Id. at 522 & n.7.
' It is interesting to note that the Court had repeatedly refused to consider the
record piracy question in many cases prior to Goldstein. One commentator has explained this constant denial by suggesting that the Court's reluctance to decide the
issue of state protection before Congress had acted to provide federal protection probably stemmed from a desire to avoid a choice between "making bad law" by permitting
state protection while completely upsetting the Sears-Compcofederal preemption doctrine and "making good law" by reaffirming Sears-Compco but thereby leaving record
companies completely unprotected. Note, Record Piracyand Copyright: PresentInadequacies and Future Overkill, 23 MMNE L. REv. 359, 393 (1971). That certiorari in the
Goldstein case was granted on May 30, 1972, 406 U.S. 956 (1972), less than four months
after the Sound Recording Amendment became effective, appears to bear out this
reasoning.
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basic grounds. They contended first that, as a constitutional matter,
the states lack authority to grant what is essentially copyright protection.'40 In addition, they argued that even if there were to be found
no constitutional preemption of the copyright field, the SearsCompco doctrine compels the conclusion that the California statute
is invalid as a matter of federal statutory preemption.' The Court
began its analysis of the issues by addressing first the question of
constitutional preemption, characterizing the problem as whether the
California statute "lies beyond the powers which the States reserved
in our federal system."'' Finding first that the constitutional grant
of copyright power to the federal government is not, on its face, an
exclusive grant, and that there is no other language in the Constitution expressly denying the states such power, the Goldstein Court
then considered a third formulation: whether the concurrent exercise
of the copyright power by the states would so conflict with the federal
exercise of such powers that it must be c6ncluded that the states have
ceded that authority completely to the federal government.'
Reasoning by analogy from the commerce clause cases,'44 the
Court took pains to differentiate between those instances when a
concurrent federal-state exercise of a similar power would inevitably
"'It is significant that the Court specifically characterized the California statute
as one which grants "copyright protection." 412 U.S. at 551. This indicates that the
Court considered that it was addressing the question of state-granted full copyright
protection head-on. Since the Court upheld the statute even with this underlying
premise, it is clear that the decision affirms the validity of those state law doctrines
and statutes which bear directly on the copyright interest, in addition to those which
only tangentially affect it. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra. Cf. note 105
supra.
"'The pirates also raised the "publication" argument. See the discussion of this
issue and the Court's treatment of it at notes 67-84 and accompanying text supra.
142412 U.S. at 552.
"'The Court rested this portion of its analysis upon a passage from Number 32 of
THE FEDERALIST in which Alexander Hamilton postulated three instances when the
vesting of exclusive authority in the federal government must be found:
[W]here the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to
the Union, and in another prohibited the States from exercising the
like authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to
which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally
contradictory and repugnant.
412 U.S. at 553, quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 241 (B. Wright ed. 1966) (A.
Hamilton) (original emphasis). The Goldstein Court dealt summarily with the first two
instances, see note 14 supra, and concentrated its analysis upon Hamilton's third
situation.
"'E.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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lead to conflict and those cases in which such conflict is simply a
possibility. It found that "[a]lthough the Copyright Clause ...
recognizes the potential benefits of a national system, it does not
indicate that all writings are of national interest or that state legislation is, in all cases, unnecessary or precluded."' 45 Nor was the
Goldstein Court able to discern an inevitable conflict arising out of
the actual exercise of concurrent copyright authority by the states.
Addressing the problem of federal-state conflict, the Court postulated
three circumstances which may arise: (1) Congress may conclude that
a particular category of writing is worthy of national protection and
may therefore extend federal copyright protection; (2) Congress may
feel that the national interest is best served by the unrestricted availability of a particular category of writings, and thus may act affirmatively to deny all protection, federal or state; or (3) Congress may
choose to stay its hand entirely.' It is in this third situation where,
under the Goldstein view, the states may act to provide protection if
they so desire. Although the Court acknowledged that state attempts
either to protect that which Congress intended to be unprotected, or
to free that which Congress intended to protect would lead to conflict,
"1412 U.S. at 556-57. In this context, the Court cited Number 43 of THE FEDERALIST
in which James Madison expressed his belief that "[t]he States cannot separately
make effectual provision" for patent or copyright protection. Id. at 556. According to
the Court, the import of Madison's declaration is that a national system is preferable
to individual state protection, but the ineffectiveness of state protection does not
present an absolute bar to the exercise of state authority. However, Douglas' dissent
in Goldstein read the quoted language as suggesting that the states may notfestablish
individual copyright protection. Id. at 572-75 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
11Id. at 559-60. However, the Court's illustration of an example of the third situation does not support the Court's conclusion. The Court points to § 2 of the Copyright
Act, which reserves common law copyright authority to the states, as an example of
an instance where Congress has chosen to stay its hand entirely. Id. at 559 & n.16.
However, the use of this example indicates that in order to find that Congress has
stayed its hand, one must also find an affirmative expresion of such intent. This
illustration underscores what some may feel is the weakness of Goldstein's ultimate
conclusion that, as to pre-February 15, 1972, sound recordings, Congress had neither
acted affirmatively to grant or deny protection and therefore the states are permitted
to extend protection as they see fit. Although § 2 of the Act has never been viewed as
the source of the states' common law copyright authority, see note 70-71 and accompanying text supra, neverthless it is an instance where Congress has expressly carved an
area out of the federal copyright scheme and reserved it to the states. In contrast, there
was no such express reservation of state authority with respect to pre-Amendment
sound recordings. See note 155 infra. Therefore, if the express provision of 17 U.S.C.
§ 2 is an example of a situation where Congress has chosen to stay its hand, then the
congressional treatment of pre-Amendment recordings, where there is no such express
provision, falls more naturally into the Court's second category where all prctection is
prohibited.
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it concluded that such conflict was not sufficiently inevitable to warrant a denial of all state power in respect to copyright. "7
Finding no problem of constitutional preemption, the Goldstein
Court then turned to a consideration of whether California's antipiracy statute was invalid as a matter of federal statutory preemption. Here the Court ran headlong into the theory of statutory
preemption underlying the Sears and Compco decisions."' The opinion noted that while the copyright clause provides a broad area within
which Congress may act, it does not require Congress to exercise the
full scope of its powers; " 9 "whether any specific category of 'Writings'
is to be brought within the purview of the federal statutory scheme
is left to the discretion of the Congress." 5 ' With its premise so formulated, the Court found nothing in the legislative or judicial history of
the sound recording question to indicate that Congress had intended
either to grant protection to this particular category of "writings" or
specifically to exempt them from all protection. Under this analysis,
pre-Amendment sound recordings therefore fall within the third type
of congressional option as a category of writifigs with respect to which
Congress has stayed its hand. Consequently, state protection of sound
recordings is valid and does not unconstitutionally conflict with the
federal scheme.
This conclusion did not, however, resolve the preemption question
in light of the approach taken in Sears and Compco and in this
respect the Goldstein Court faced its most problematical issue. The
Goldstein pirates had raised the argument that, as a statutory mat"1412U.S. at 559. That this analysis is filithetical to Learned Hand's view on
the matter is clear. Where Hand found complete federal preemption flowing from the
copyright clause, Goldstein found only a non-exclusive grant of federal copyright.
Under Hand's formulation, only the first two of Goldstein's three possible situations
can exist because of the preemptive effect of the copyright clause. That is, Hand felt
that either a writing is protected by a copyright under the federal statute, or it is denied
all protection by force of the constitutional provision. The suggestion that Congress
may eschew all action entirely and thus leave the question of protection entirely in the
hands of the states would undoubtedly have struck Hand as novel at best, and he
would surely have demanded a clear, affirmative congressional declaration of this
intent before conceding to the states the authority to act. That Goldstein grants that
authority even in the absence of such an affirmative expression of congressional intent
is perhaps more a reflection of the philosophical disposition of the Goldstein Court
than an indication of a weakness in Hand's methodology.
"'For an interesting analysis of the conflict between Goldstein and the SearsCompco doctrine, see Goldstein, "InconsistentPremises" and the "Acceptable Middle
Ground:" A Comment on Goldstein v. California, 21 BULL. CR.Soc. 25 (1973).
"'412 U.S. at 562. The congressional power to act with respect to copyrights is, of
course, as broad as the constitutional term "writings." See generally note 74 supra.
111412 U.S. at 562.
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ter, "Congress so occupied the field of copyright protection as to preempt all comparable state action,"' 5 ' citing the Sears and Compco
decisions and § § 452 and 5153 of the Copyright Act. Although these
sections of the Act appear, at least on their faces, to reflect a congressional intent to exercise fully the copyright power, the Court noted
that the sections have never been given this interpretation throughout the more than sixty year history of the Act. Particularly, the
Court pointed to sound recordings as an example of a category of
otherwise constitutionally copyrightable "writings" which have consistently been denied statutory copyright protection under the Act.' 54
However, to say that no federal copyright protection exists for preAmendment sound recordings is not to say that Congress has completely stayed its hand with regard to them.' 5 Indeed, this is the
precise point of divergence between the Goldstein decision and the
Sears-Compco presumption "that congressional silence betokens a
determination that the benefits of competition outweigh the impediments placed on creativity by the lack of copyright protection
. . "56 In contrast, for the Goldstein Court congressional silence as
to a particular category of writings evinces an intent to leave that
category untouched and thus open to state action.
This conclusion, however, necessitated distinguishing the SearsCompco decisions from the case at bar. The Goldstein Court did this
by holding Sears and Compco strictly to their facts as cases involving
only patent law and stressing the inherent differences between the
federal patent and copyright schemes of protection. In the patent
field, the Court reasoned, Congress has set particular standards of
51

1d. at 567.

5217 U.S.C. § 4 (1970) provides: "The works for which copyright may be secured

under this title shall include all the writings of an author."
'17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970), as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 5(n) (Supp. 1I, 1972). After
enumerating the specific categories of works subject to the federal copyright, § 5
provides: "The above specifications shall not be held to limit the subject matter of
copyright as defined in section 4 of this title . .. ."
5
The Court cited the House and Senate Reports which accompanied the Sound
Recording Amendment wherein it was acknowledged that, absent the Amendment, no
federal statutory protection exists for recordings. 412 U.S. at 568; see H.R. REP. No.
487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971); S. REP. No. 72, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971). But
see note 123 supra, discussing the several cases which have recognized a right of action
for infringement under the Copyright Act in the owner of a copyright in a musical
composition against one who pirates a recording containing that composition.
' 1The House Report accompanying the Sound Recording Amendment took pains
to point out that no opinion was expressed therein concerning this question of federal
statutory preemption of pre-Amendment recordings. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1971).
156412 U.S. at 579 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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novelty and usefulness which must be met in order that a mechanical
configuration may receive patent protection: "The standards established for granting federal patent protection ... indicated not only
which [mechanical configurations] Congress wished to protect, but
which configurations it wished to remain free."' 5 The line between
qualifying for patent protection and denial of protection therefore
represents the fulcrum in the balance Congress has struck between
free availability and the patent monopoly. However, in the Goldstein
Court's view, Congress has drawn no such line with respect to copyright protection. Instead of having to meet particular standards in
order to qualify for federal protection, a particular writing need only
fall within one of the statutorily enumerated categories of writings in
order to receive a federal copyright.'58 Goldstein concluded that this
use of a category system in the area of federal copyrights indicates
nothing about whether Congress struck a balance between free accessibility and copyright protection. Therefore, the failure to include a
particular category of "writings" within the purview of the Copyright
Act, without more, indicates that Congress has merely chosen to stay
its hand.
It was primarily upon this last point that Mr. Justice Marshall
chose to rest his dissent. He acknowledged that in the ordinary situation it is difficult to infer from legislative inaction any affirmative
conclusions. He argued, however, in the Sears and Compco cases it
was held "that with respect to patents and copyrights, the ordinary
practice was not to prevail";'59 it is to be presumed from congressional
silence that the federally unprotected categories of writings are to be
freely available. State law which purports to grant copyright-like
protection must therefore fall in the face of this federal policy. However, the majority's holding in Goldstein appears to have invalidated
the Sears-Compco presumption as applied to the copyright field and
in so doing, upheld the authority of the states to provide full copyright protection of unlimited duration to sound recordings fixed prior
to the effective date of the Sound Recording Amendment."'
'571d. at 569.

5
'1
The federally protected categories of writings are specified in 17 U.S.C. § 5
(1970) and 17 U.S.C. § 5(n) (Supp. II, 1972).
'1412 U.S. at 577 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"'Goldsteinthus validates state anti-piracy statutes as applied to pre-Amendment
sound recordings. Following is a list of the state anti-piracr statutes which have been
enacted to date. The list includes citations to state session laws in instances where the
statute has not yet been transferred to the state's official code:
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1024 (Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 414617 to -4621 (Supp. 1973); CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (West 1970);
Pub. Act. No. 74-160, Conn. Legislature (1974): FLA. STAT. ANN.
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Conclusion

The Goldstein decision holds great significance in several respects. It reaffirms the states' authority to grant common law copyright protection both to writings subject to the federal copyright and
to those not included within the federal act. In addition, it makes
clear that, contrary to the Hand position, the crucial issue of publication as regards those categories of writings not enumerated in the
Copyright Act is a matter solely of state law. Goldstein also clarifies
the question of the permissible duration of the state law protection
by expressly holding that the states are not to be held to the constitutional "limited times" mandate specified in the copyright clause. In
so holding, it appears that the Supreme Court has validated potentially perpetual state common law protection based upon a statedefined test of publication.
However, the full impact of Goldstein lies primarily in its apparent precedent-breaking approval of state laws, common or statutory,
which extend full copyright protection to those writings not subject
to a federal copyright. Although there is always hesitancy to read a
newly decided case too broadly, nevertheless the extensive sweep of
Goldstein would appear to justify the conclusion that many of the
earlier notions of federal preemption in the area of copyright, particularly- those expressed by Learned Hand and those embodied in the
Sears and Compco decisions, are no longer valid. Instead, these ideas
have been replaced with the view that where Congress has not acted
§ 543.041 (Supp. 1973-74); ch. 7, §.. 1-3 (1974), Ind. Laws; Ky. General Assembly, House Bill No. 378 (March 15, 1974); LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 14:223-:223.4 (Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 467A (Supp.
1973); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 143 (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT.
§§ 325.841-.844 (Supp. 1974); Miss. Legislature, Senate Bill No. 2105
(eft. date, July 1, 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.217 (1973); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 352-A:1-:4 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-1641 to -42 (not yet in code); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 561 (McKinney
1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 14, art. 56A (effective date, Jan. 1, 1975);
ch. 747, § 1 (1973) Ore. Laws 1820; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4116
(1973); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4244 to -4250 (Cum. Supp. 1973);
TEX. ANN. Civ. STAT. art. 9012 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 1310-1 to -6 (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-41.1 to -41.6 (Repl.
Vol. 1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.26.010-.020 (Supp. 1972)
(anti-counterfeiting statute); ch. 100 (1974), 43d Wash. Legislature,
3d Ext. Sess. (anti-piracy statute).
In addition to the above noted statutes, anti-piracy legislation is about to be introduced in both Maine and Vermont. BILLBOARD, May 4, 1974, at 1. A bill has been
introduced into both houses of the Oklahoma legislature (H.B. No. 1243 and S.B. No.
483), but passage this session appears unlikely. Id. at 4. Similar legislation in Georgia
has failed to pass the Senate. BILLBOARD, April 27, 1974, at 1. Finally, Nebraska and
Ohio have also recently enacted anti-piracy statutes, but the specific citations for these
laws are not currently available.
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affirmatively either to grant or to deny protection, the states are fully
competent to establish individual copyright schemes'"' and grant protection potentially unlimited in duration.'62 This holding therefore
places a sizeable burden upon Congress to make clear when its nonprotection of a particular category of writings is to be read as an
affirmative denial of all protection whatsoever, and when it should
be viewed as simply a staying of its hand.'63 It is in this latter case
where the states may act to provide protection.
The direct effect of Goldstein in the context of the sound recording
question is to permit the states to fill the gap in protection left by
Congress in limiting the Sound Recording Amendment to prospective
application only. Thus by a combination of both federal and state
law, the legitimate recording industry now has an effective means of
combatting record piracy. However, the analysis applied by the Supreme Court goes beyond the sound recording question and would
appear to extend to the states the copyright power in other situations
as well. Whether they will seek to exercise fully this newly-delineated
authority remains to be seen.'64 However, if the states should choose
to exercise this authority the Goldstein decision will doubtlessly serve
'"'One commentator reads Goldstein broadly and suggests that it validates a virtual sub-strata of copyright systems at the state level, complete with registration
requirements, filing procedures and other elements found in the existing federal system. Kaul, And Now, State Protection of Intellectual Property?, 60 A.B.A.J. 198
(1974). See also note 140 supra.
"'A recent comment on the Goldstein case takes issue with the Court's reasoning
that there are writings which do not warrant federal protection but which may be of
sufficient local interest to justify state protection. The fallacy of this reasoning, in that
writer's view, is that it focuses on the nature of the writing itself, while ignoring that
the industry (e.g. the recording industry) may be national in scope. See Comment,
Copyrights: States Allowed to Protect Works Not Copyrightable Under Federal
Law, 58 MINN. L. REv. 316, 322-23 (1973).
'-Actually, it is perhaps more accurate to say that this burden will fall upon the
courts, for it is they who will have to determine congressional intent. Of course, after
Goldstein this question is settled with regard to pre-Amendment sound recordings.
There remain, however, several categories of writings which have not been brought
within the purview of the copyright act and which are therefore, under Goldstein,
potentially subject to state protection. These categories include computer programs,
clothing style designs, performing styles, choreographic works, printed forms, titles,
business systems and "discoveries of laws of nature." See Kaul, And Now, State
Protection of Intellectual Property?, 60 A.B.A.J. 198, 201-02 (1974), discussing each
of these categories in some detail. For an extensive discussion of state law protection
of trade secrets and an analysis of Goldstein's effect upon such protection, see Wydick,
Trade Secrets: FederalPreemptionin Light of Goldstein and Kewanee, 55 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 736 (Part I) (1973); 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 4 (Part I) (1974).
"'Atleast with respect to sound recordings, there have been increasing efforts by
the states to afford protection. See note 160 supra.

